Reforming the Fair Labor Standards Act:
Recognizing On-Call Time as a Distinct
Category of Compensable Work
By

LOREN SCHWARTZ*

IN FEBRUARY 1982, Houston Northwest Medical Center ("Northwest") gave Frederick Bright a promotion and a leash.' After working
as a biomedical equipment repair technician for a little over a year,
Bright was promoted to the position of senior biomedical equipment
repair technician. 2 His new position required him to carry a pager
during all off-duty hours and subjected him to the following three restrictions: (1) he was required to always be reachable by the pager; (2)
he could not be "intoxicated or impaired to the degree that he could
not work on medical equipment"; and (3) he had to always be in a
position where he could be at the hospital within approximately
3
twenty minutes of being paged.
For eleven months straight, Frederick Bright was on-call. 4 Notjust
on holidays and not just on the weekends, Frederick Bright was on-call
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, for eleven months
straight. 5 Although he could go home after work, home was about as
far as he could go. 6 Along with his promotion, Frederick Bright was
issued a twenty-minute electronic leash so that no matter what he was
doing at a given time, he had to be able to leave at a moment's notice
and be close enough to the hospital that he could get there within
twenty minutes. 7 For eleven months, Bright could not so much as go
* I would like to thank my parents for all their years of care and support, Professor
Maria Ontiveros for working with me on initial drafts of this Comment, and my editor,
Jason Horst, for his hard work in bringing this Comment to publication.
1. Bright v. Houston Nw. Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 673 (5th Cir. 1991).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 673, 679. Being on-call means that the employee is not actively working on
his employer's premises although he must be available to report to his employer if so requested. See infra Part I.A.
5. Bright, 934 F.2d at 673, 679.
6. Id. at 673.
7. Id.
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out for dinner or to the movie theater without the very real possibility
that he would have to leave whatever he was doing and immediately
report to work. 8
As Judge Jerre Williams of the Fifth Circuit later stated:
[Bright] was not far removed from a prisoner serving a sentence
under slightly relaxed house arrest terms. He never could go to
downtown Houston, he never could go to Galveston and see the
ocean. He never could go to a baseball or football game in the
Astrodome. An out of town event, even a visit to relatives or friends
in San Antonio or Austin, was totally out of the question.9
After leaving the job in January 1983, Bright sued Northwest
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA" or "Act"),1° seeking overtime compensation for his on-call time."1 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas granted Northwest's motion
for summary judgment, holding that because Bright was not technically "working" during his on-call time, he was not entitled to any compensation.1 2 On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on the merits.' 3 On
rehearing en banc, however, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision. 14 While acknowledging "the obvious truth that the
long continued aspect of Bright's on-call status made his job highly
undesirable and arguably somewhat oppressive," the court found it
"obvious that the FLSA overtime provisions provide no relief for those
oppressive and confining conditions." 15
The problem with the Bright decision is not that it was wrongly
decided, but rather that it was correctly decided. While the FLSA
seeks to protect workers from being exploited by their employers, it is
altogether impotent to address situations such as Bright's. Under the
FLSA, someone is either working-in which case they must be paid a
minimum wage-or they are not working-in which case no compensation is due.1 6 Because on-call time does not fit neatly into either of
these two categories, any attempt to adjudicate on-call claims under
the FLSA is akin to trying to force a square peg through a round hole.
8.

Id. at 673, 679.

9.

Bright v. Houston Nw. Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 888 F.2d 1059, 1064 (5th Cir.

1989).
10.

29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000).

11.
12.

Bright, 888 F.2d at 1060.
Bright, 934 F.2d at 674.

13.

Bright, 888 F.2d at 1064.

14.
15.

Bright, 934 F.2d at 679.
Id. at 678-79.

16.

See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2000).
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This Comment argues that the FLSA, as currently drafted, is incapable ofjustly addressing the issue of on-call time and that, as such, an
amendment that expressly addresses the issue of on-call time is
needed. More specifically, this Comment contends that statutorily separating on-call time from "regular" work time and setting a separate
minimum wage and overtime premium for hours spent on-call are essential in order to eliminate the fallacious presumption by which oncall time must necessarily be characterized as either work or leisure.
At the same time, such an amendment would stem the systematic exploitation of on-call employees and fulfill the FLSA's goal of promoting fairness to workers.
Part I of this Comment examines the on-call relationship itself
and explains why the FLSA, by its own terms, is ill-equipped to deal
with the issue of on-call time. Part II details the difficulties that the
lower courts have had in adjudicating on-call cases under the current
framework. Part III explains why the FLSA ought to be amended and
concludes with my proposal.
I.

On-Call Arrangements Challenge the Traditional
Boundaries Between Work and Leisure

A.

The Emergence of On-Call Time as a Unique Employment
Relationship

"On-call" time refers to time where an employee is not actively on
duty but must nevertheless be available to report to his employer if so
requested. 17 Typically, an on-call employee will enjoy more personal
freedom than an employee on active duty. For example, whereas an
on-duty employee is generally required to remain on the employer's
premises or at an otherwise designated place of work, 18 the on-call
employee is more likely to be allowed to leave his place of employment. 19 Furthermore, unlike the on-duty employee who may find himself under the continual supervision and/or direction of his employer,
the on-call employee is given considerably more freedom to engage in
activities of his choosing.
Despite the relative freedoms that on-call employees may enjoy,
as the Bright case illustrates, such employees are far from free. By virtue of being on-call, an employee must structure his "free time" in
17.
18.
19.

1 MATTHEW BENDER, 3
See 1 id § 6.01.
See I id. § 3.07[e][1].

CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAw §

3.07[e] [i] (2004).
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such a way that he can always be ready to report to work if needed. 20
Even where the employee is not actually called in, the fact that he may
be called in will generally prevent him from engaging in a wide range
of activities; anything that is either too far away from the worksite or
that requires a solid block of time will generally be, as a practical mat21
ter, prohibited.
Although the notion of on-call time is not new, technological developments in the last forty years have dramatically increased its feasibility. The influx of pagers in the 1970s and mobile phones in the
1980s made it significantly easier for employers to contact off-duty employees and call them into work. 22 Meanwhile, increased global competition in the 1990s forced many domestic employers to re-evaluate
the efficiency of their staffing arrangements. 23 Many employers began
to recognize how an on-call staff could be used to efficiently accommodate workload fluctuations. 24 Particularly in industries where the
demand for a product or service is subject to fluctuation with little or
no notice, on-call arrangements allowed employers to pay employees
for work done as the demand for such work arose. 25 Employers could
thus ensure that their workloads were fulfilled without having to pay
26
employees for periods of idleness.
Given the improved ability of employers to communicate with offduty employees, along with the economic pressures to improve
workforce efficiency, 2 7 on-call arrangements had attained significant
popularity among employers in the 1990S.28 Not coincidentally, more

See 1 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 501 (3d ed. 2005).
21. Id.
22. See Trends & Tangents, Beepers by the Million, FORBES, Apr. 15, 1997, at 8.
23. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/history/herman/reports/futurework/report/chapter
6/main2.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
24. See Christopher S. Miller et al., On-Call Policies Help Avoid Overtime Pay, HR MAGAZINE, July 1996, at 57, 57.
25. Id.
26. To illustrate, consider the hospital in Bright, which needed to ensure that its biomedical equipment could be fixed swiftly if the need arose. See Bright v. Houston Nw.
Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 672 (1991). By having Bright on-call, the hospital
was able to ensure that its equipment would be fixed if needed without having to pay
someone to be on the premises on a continual basis. Id.
27. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 23.
28. See also Marisa DiNatale, Characteristicsof and Preferencesfor Alternative Work Arrangements, 1999, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Mar. 2001, at 28, 31 (stating that by the 1990s there were
at least two million employees in on-call relationships nationwide).
20.
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employees began seeking compensation for such time by filing suit
29
under the FLSA.
B.

The Fair Labor Standards Act Creates a Work/Leisure
Paradigm Under Which On-Call Cases Must Be
Adjudicated

In 1938, Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act to correct the "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers." 30 To this end, the FLSA created both "Minimum Wage" and "Maximum Hours" provisions. Under the "Minimum
Wage" provision, covered employees 3 1 must receive no less than a
specified minimum wage for each hour worked. 32 The "Maximum
Hours" provision requires the payment of one and a half times the
33
regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty per week.
While the FLSA thus establishes certain guidelines for compensating employees for their work, it neither defines the term "work" nor
indicates when on-call time might be considered "work." Because the
Act is silent as to the treatment that is to be accorded on-call time, for
purposes of the Act, such time is necessarily forced into either the
"work" box or the "leisure" box. Such a paradigm ignores the possibility that perhaps on-call time does not belong in either box.
C.

Current FLSA Work/Leisure Paradigm Necessarily
Facilitates Inequitable On-Call Working Arrangements

Clifford Sharp, a noted scholar in the area of economics and
time, has argued that to divide time into only two categories-work
time and non-work time-is "an extremely crude and not very logical
division." 34 Nevertheless, the FLSA does precisely that.35 Under the
29. See Eric Phillips, Note, On-Call Time Under the FairLabor StandardsAct, 95 MICH. L.
Rv. 2633, 2635 (1997) ("Only in the past decade have federal appellate courts examined
whether particular on-call arrangements require compensation under the FLSA.").
30. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
31. The FLSA covers approximately sixty percent of the workers in the United States.
SeeJon Tevlin, Workplace Dilemma: Cash or Time Off?, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 5, 1997,
at 1D. Among the largest groups of employees exempt from the FLSA are professional,
administrative, and executive employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2000).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (setting the current minimum wage at $5.15 per hour).
33. Id. § 207(a).
34. CLIFFORD SHARP, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME 122 (1981).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (requiring that "[e]very employer . . . pay to each of his
employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
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FLSA, a line has been drawn where an employee is either working or
not working. 36 While this division may be convenient, it is imprudently rigid and, by its very terms, unable to equitably account for the
realities of on-call employment relationships.
During congressional hearings on the FLSA, the statute's chief
advocate, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, spoke of ensuring that a
person would receive a "fair day's pay for a fair day's work."3 7 Indeed,
a central motivation for enacting the FLSA was to ensure that people
received compensation based, at least in part, on the value of their
services. 38 Against this backdrop, this Comment submits that an equitable employment relationship is one in which an employee is compensated at a level that is roughly commensurate to the benefit that
the employee provides to his employer per their employment
39
agreement.
Under a strict dichotomy in which an employee's time is considered either fully-compensable work or non-compensable leisure time,
the establishment of an equitable on-call employment relationship
proves largely elusive. Whether the time is considered work or leisure,
one party will receive an undeserved windfall.
Although not burdened to the extent of workers on active duty,
40
on-call workers typically face significant restrictions on their liberty.
At the same time, their employers obtain a substantial benefit by being able to keep their workforces lean, knowing that if extra work
arises, they may simply call on an off-duty, on-call employee.
As such, considering an on-call employee's efforts, classifying
time as leisure, and thus non-compensable, fails to equitably account
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce" a minimum wage).
36. Id.
37. 81 CONG. REc. 4983 (1937) (message from President Roosevelt to Congress).
38. See Phillips, supra note 29, at 2646 n.67 (stating that "advocates of the FLSA believed that basing the minimum wage in part on the value of service was critical to its
viability").
39. This is not to suggest that every conceivable benefit that an employee confers
upon his employer ought to be compensated. For example, where an employee acts
outside the scope of his employment agreement and chooses to voluntarily act in a way that
benefits his employer, compensation will ordinarily not be appropriate. To illustrate, consider an employee who goes to a dinner party and speaks highly of his employer to any
guest who will listen. If the employee, of his own volition, does so simply because he is fond
of his employer, there is no need for compensation. On the other hand, if part of the
employee's job requirements is that he attend dinner parties and speak highly of his employer at these parties, then compensation would be appropriate.
40. See supra Part L.A (discussing how on-call duty may restrict an employee's personal freedom).
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for the burdens imposed on the worker and the concomitant benefits
that flow to the employer. In this situation, the employer receives the
windfall in that he receives the benefit of having a worker on-call without having to tender any compensation for having received this benefit. Conversely, considering an employee's on-call time as work, and
thus compensable at his regular rate of pay, may provide the employee with a windfall since, he will be compensated at the same rate
as if he was actively working.
Theoretically, then, the work/leisure dichotomy threatens to unduly prejudice both the employer and the employee. However, given
that on-call time does not conform to traditional conceptions of work,
courts faced with the task of classifying on-call time as either work or
leisure, have, for the most part, opted for the latter. Consequently, as
a practical matter and as the following Part illustrates, the work/leisure dichotomy has operated primarily to the benefit of the employer-and to the detriment of their on-call employees.
II.

Courts Struggle to Produce Equitable and Consistent
Results Without Wandering Astray of the FLSA's
Work/Leisure Paradigm

A.

The Supreme Court's Framework for Addressing On-Call
Compensation Preserves the Work/Leisure Paradigm

In 1944, the United States Supreme Court, for the first and only
time, addressed the issue of time spent on-call in the companion cases
of Armour & Co. v. Wantock" and Skidmore v. Swift. 42 Both cases in-

volved firefighters who, in addition to their regular workweeks, were
often required to remain on their employers' premises during off-duty
hours to answer alarms. 43 In both cases, the plaintiffs sued under the
44
FLSA to recover compensation for their off-duty hours spent on-call.
The Court in Skidmore stated that there was nothing in either the
FLSA or in any case law to suggest that "waiting time" could not also
be compensable "working time. '4 5 In Armour, the Court reinforced
this principle when it stated that "[r]efraining from other activity
often is a factor of instant readiness to serve, and idleness plays a part
in all employments in a stand-by capacity. Readiness to serve may be
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

323 U.S. 126 (1944).
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Armour, 323 U.S. at 127; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135.
Armour, 323 U.S. at 127-28; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135.
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136.
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hired, quite as much as service itself ... ,"46 Consequently, the Court
held that, as a matter of law, time spent on-call could, under appropriate circumstances, be considered working time for which employees
47
would have to be compensated.
According to the Court, the relevant inquiry should be whether
an employee is "engaged to wait" or "waiting to be engaged" 48 or, similarly, whether the on-call time is spent predominantly for the benefit
of the employer or the employee. 49 As the Court indicated, an employee whose on-call time is spent predominantly for his own benefit
or who is "waiting to be engaged" is not entitled to compensation.
Conversely, an employee whose on-call time is spent predominantly
for the employer's benefit and who is thus "engaged to wait" is entitled to compensation. 50 The Court directed lower courts to consider
"all the circumstances of the case" in making their determinations. 51
By requiring that the on-call time be classified as either fully compensable work time or non-compensable leisure time, the Supreme
Court preserved the strict work/leisure paradigm that is inherent in
the FLSA. Meanwhile, the Court provided little real guidance to lower
courts faced with the task of adjudicating cases under this paradigm.
While the Court directed lower courts to assess who received the "predominant benefit" of the on-call arrangement, it failed to offer any
significant criteria for guiding this determination. Although semantically appealing, the "engaged to wait" versus "waiting to be engaged"
distinction has offered little, if any, substantive value to the inquiry.
Moreover, the Court's statement that the outcome is to depend on
"all the circumstances" has been similarly unhelpful. 52
B.

The Work/Leisure Paradigm and the Supreme Court's Failure
to Provide Meaningful Guidance Under This Paradigm
Leads to Inconsistent and Inequitable Results in
the Lower Courts

1.

Inconsistency in the Lower Courts

One of the primary practical difficulties that courts have had in
adjudicating on-call claims lies in the fact that assessing who ultimately
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Armour, 323 U.S. at 133.
Id. at 134.
Skidmore, 323 U.S at 137.
Armour, 323 U.S. at 133.
Id.; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137.
Armour, 323 U.S. at 133.
Id.
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received the predominant benefit of the time spent on-call entails a
comparison of phenomena which, by nature, are difficult to compare.
On the one hand, courts must consider the benefit that inures to the
employer by way of having a workforce in reserve. On the other hand,
they are to consider the benefit that the employee enjoys from having
the freedom to be away from the worksite and engaged in activities
that he might not otherwise be able to pursue. While assessing the
benefit to the employer may, to a large extent, be examined by a
quantitative analysis of labor expenditures saved, evaluating the extent
to which an employee is able to enjoy his time on-call is purely qualitative. To compare the two then becomes somewhat like comparing apples and oranges.
Because the Supreme Court, in preserving the work/leisure paradigm, failed to provide any meaningful guidance for applying its "predominant benefit" test, lower courts have approached the issue of oncall time in a variety of ways. Some courts have approached the issue
by making a generalized inquiry into the severity of the burdens
placed on the on-call employees. Even amongst these courts, however,
different circuits have frequently disagreed over the proper way to
frame this inquiry. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has stated simply
that a court will grant compensation if it determines that the employee's off-duty time is "severely restricted." 53 The Tenth Circuit,
while maintaining the same type of general inquiry, takes a more liberal approach by awarding compensation where the on-call requirements have interfered (although not necessarily "severely") with the
employees' personal pursuits. 54 Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit asks
whether the restrictions placed on the employee "are so onerous as to
prevent employees from effectively using the time for personal
pursuits."

55

53. Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, Ala., 970 F.2d 802, 810 (lth Cir. 1992).
54. See Armitage v. City of Emporia, Kan., 982 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 1992).
55. Martin v. Ohio Tpk. Comm'n, 968 F.2d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 1992). While such generalized approaches of the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits presumably represent an
attempt to comply with the Supreme Court's command to consider "all the circumstances
of the case," Armour, 323 U.S. at 133, practically speaking, these approaches frequently
result in analyses which are overly conclusory. See, e.g.,
Birdwel 970 F.2d at 810 (reaching a
conclusion after only a cursory review of the evidence); Spires v. Ben Hill County, 745 F.
Supp. 690, 702 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (same). In Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, Alabama, 970 F.2d
802 (11 th Cir. 1992), a group of city-employed detectives sued their employer seeking compensation for their time spent on call. Id. at 807. The court, in seeking to apply the Supreme Court's "predominant benefit" test, held that an on-call employee's time had to be
"severely restricted" in order to constitute compensable work. Id. at 810. After a cursory
review of the evidence, the court summarily concluded that the detectives' on-call time
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In contrast to these generalized approaches, other circuit have
conducted more mechanical analyses in which the courts base their
determination on a review of specific factors. The Ninth Circuit, for
example, has identified eight factors that it uses to decide whether oncall time should be compensated. They are: (1) whether the employee
is required to remain at the employer's worksite, (2) whether there
are excessive geographical restrictions on the employee's movements,
(3) whether the frequency of calls are unduly restrictive, (4) whether
a fixed time limit for response is unduly restrictive, (5) whether the
on-call employee can easily trade on-call responsibilities, (6) whether
use of a pager or cellular phone could ease restrictions, (7) whether
the employee has actually engaged in personal activities during call-in
time, and (8) whether there exists an agreement between the parties
6
as to compensation for on-call time. 5
Given the different approaches adopted by the different circuits,
cases involving similar fact patterns have often produced opposite rulings. 57 In Bright, the Fifth Circuit approached the case by making a
generalized inquiry into whether Mr. Bright could use his on-call time
"effectively for his .. . own purposes."58 After focusing much of its

analysis on the geographical restrictions placed on Bright, the court
concluded that despite the twenty-four hour on-call policy of his employer, he was not entitled to compensation for this time. 59
In Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Commission,60 the Eighth Circuit was
confronted with a twenty-four hour on-call policy much like the one in
Bright.6 1 Similar to the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit framed the
"was not so restricted that it was not used predominately for their benefit" and that, as
such, they were not entitled to any compensation for that time. Id.
56. Owens v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 971 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1992). The first seven
factors are explicitly mentioned as relevant to determining the extent to which an on-call
employee is able to use his on-call time for personal purposes. Id. The eighth factor is
mentioned separately as relevant in determining whether the time was spent predominantly for the benefit of the employer or the employee. See also Cross v. Ark. Forestry
Comm'n, 938 F.2d 912, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the following factors: (1)
geographic restrictions placed on the employee; (2) the types of activities they could pursue; (3) the impact being on-call on their enjoyment of such activities; and (4) the duration of the on-call status).
57. Compare Bright v. Houston Nw. Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 679 (5th
Cir. 1991) (employee subject to twenty-four hour on-call policy with mandatory response
time of approximately twenty minutes not entitled to compensation) with Cross v. Ark.
Forestry Comm'n, 938 F.2d 912, 914, 918 (8th Cir. 1991) (employees subject to twenty-four
hour on-call policy with mandatory thirty-minute response time entitled to compensation).
58. Bright, 934 F.2d at 673.
59. Id. at 679.
60. 938 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 914
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issue in terms of whether the on-call policy restricted "the employee[s] from using the time for personal pursuits." 62 Although the
Eighth Circuit expressed concern over the geographic limitations
placed on the employees, this concern figured into only one of several
factors that the court considered. Unlike the court in Bright, the
Eighth Circuit expressed particular concern as to the types of activities
the employees could pursue while on-call, the impact that being oncall had on their enjoyment of such activities, and the duration of the
employees' on-call status. 6 3 After considering each of these factors,
the court concluded that, unlike the employee in Bright, the employees in Cross were entided to compensation for their time spent oncall.

64

Thus, although the courts in Bright and Cross faced similar factual
scenarios, the Supreme Court's failure to articulate clearer standards
for the adjudication of on-call cases under the work/leisure paradigm
permitted the courts to engage in markedly different analyses. These
differing analyses, in turn, led them to different results. Until lower
courts receive more guidance in the adjudication of on-call cases, ideally in the form of an amendment abolishing the work/leisure framework, such inconsistencies will likely continue to persist.
2.

Inequitable Results in the Lower Courts

Aside from the inconsistencies that have emerged under the current work/leisure framework, the Supreme Court's directive that
courts consider all the circumstances has permitted courts to consider
a wide range of factors, many of which have almost universally militated against awarding compensation for time spent on-call. The use
of these criteria has consequently perpetuated the type of inequitable
results that the FLSA was designed to remedy.
Some courts, for example, in determining the compensability of
an employee's on-call time have considered whether the employee actually engaged in personal activities while on-call. 65 Such an inquiry,
62. Id. at 916.
63. Id. at 917-18.
64. Id. at 918.
65. See, e.g., Rousseau v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 805 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th
Cir. 1986) (pointing out that while on-call, the employees were "free to sleep, eat, watch
television, watch VCR movies, play pingpong or cards, read, [and] listen to music"); Bright,
934 F.2d at 673 (indicating that Bright, while on call, "not only stayed at home and
watched television and the like, but also engaged in other activities away from home, including his 'normal shopping' (including supermarket and mall shopping) and 'occasionally' going out to restaurants to eat"); Brekke v. City of Blackduck, 984 F. Supp. 1209, 1222
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however, will often be irrelevant in assessing the burden actually imposed on the on-call worker. This is for two reasons. First, the inquiry
is unduly limited in its scope. The Bright court, in ruling that the plaintiff's on-call time was non-compensable, pointed to the fact that Bright
had been able to watch television during his on-call time, as well as
engage in other activities away from home, including shopping for
groceries and "occasionally" eating out. 66 The problem with this analy-

sis is that it completely ignores everything that he could not do while
on-call. The fact that he could watch television and shop for groceries
does not change the fact that anything requiring a solid block of time
was essentially prohibited.
Second, asking whether the employee actually engaged in personal activities ignores the fact that simply being on-call may produce
a psychological burden that impairs the ability of on-call employees to
enjoy such activities. 6 7 As one court pointed out in the context of an
on-call requirement for firefighters: "The necessity to quickly respond
to fire emergencies requires that the employees be physically and
mentally capable of fighting a fire and therefore restricts their enjoyment of many recreational activities. '68 Research on the impact of oncall work has raised the prospect that the arrangements may increase
an employee's stress and decrease his mental well-being. 69
In the Bright case, Bright testified that he was called into work, on
average, about two times during the week and two to three times on
the weekend. 70 Consider the situation in which, on a Thursday during
a week in which Bright had not yet been called in, a family member
asked him to go out to dinner. In such a situation, Bright would have
had two options: stay at home, so as to not risk the disruption if he
were called in, or go to dinner, aware of the very realistic possibility
that he might have to leave at a moment's notice. For a court to then
point to the fact that he was able to go to dinner ignores the fact that
the quality of the outing was likely hampered by the anticipation of
being called into work. While the burden of knowing that one may be
(D. Minn. 1997) (noting that the plaintiff, while on call "was able to socialize, attend
church services, read, watch television, and participate in similar activities").
66. Bright, 934 F.2d at 673.
67. Studies have shown "that on-call work may play a role in increasing stress and
decreasing mental well-being." Anne-Marie Nicol & Jackie S. Botterill, On-Call Work and
Health: A Review, in 3 ENV. HEALTHJ. art. 15, at 5, http://www.ehjournal.net/content/pdf/
1476-069x-3-15.pdf (2004) (providing a summary of these studies and a more detailed look
at the health effects of on-call work).
68. Cross, 938 F.2d at 917.
69. Nicol & Botterill, supra note 67, at 5.
70. Bright, 934 F.2d at 674.
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called into work at any moment may not, by itself, warrant compensation at the level of an actively working employee, it nevertheless remains a very real dynamic of on-call relationships that should not be
ignored.
In addition to making a blanket inquiry into whether an employee actually engaged in personal activities while on-call, many
courts have considered the ability of the on-call employee to trade his
on-call shift to a fellow employee. 7 1 These courts reason that possessing such freedom lessens the burden placed on the employee. 72 The
problem with this argument is that the ability to trade on-call responsibilities does not in any way alter the nature of the time actually spent
on-call. 73 One who can trade his on-call responsibilities, but chooses
not to, still faces the same burdens of being on-call that he would have
faced had he not had the option.
Finally, numerous courts have looked to employer-employee
agreements to help determine whether the parties themselves considered the on-call time to be working time.7 4 This inquiry is flawed, however, in that it presupposes that parties can contract around the

71. See, e.g., Brigham v. Eugene Water & Elec. Bd., 357 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2004);
Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1994).
72. See, e.g., Owens v. ITT Rayonier, Inc. 971 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding
the ability to trade on-call responsibility important in determining whether an employee
could engage in personal pursuits); Brock v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 826 F.2d 369, 373
(5th Cir. 1987) (finding that ability to trade on-call shift lessens burden on the employee
by permitting the employee to leave the employer's premises).
73. See Phillips, supra note 29, at 2648 (quoting Truslow v. Spotsylvania County Sheriff, 783 F. Supp. 274, 278 (E.D. Va. 1992) (internal citation omitted)) ("The ability to trade
shifts does not change the nature of the time spent while actually on call. How the employee came to perform the service should not matter: 'IT] he crucial question [under the
FLSA] is not whether the work was voluntary, but rather whether the [p]laintiffwas in fact
performing services for the benefit of the employer with the knowledge and approval of
the employer.' An employee who accepts a normal shift of work must be compensated,
even though he voluntarily accepted it and possibly could have traded it. On-call time
should be treated no differently.").
74. See, e.g., Owens, 971 F.2d at 354 (indicating that an "important factor in determining if the on-call time was spent predominantly for the benefit of the employer is whether
the policy was based on an agreement between the parties"); Brock, 826 F.2d at 374 (quoting Allen v. Ad. Richfield Co., 724 F.2d 1131, 1136 (5th Cir. 1984)) (stating that "[t]he
existence of such an agreement [is] a 'circumstance to consider in determining whether
the off-duty time' is spent primarily for the employee's or employer's benefit"); Rousseau v.
Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 805 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
existence of an agreement is relevant to compensability); Cleary v. ADM Milling Co., 827 F.
Supp. 472, 476 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding the existence of an agreement to be an "important
factor in determining whether on-call time is compensable").

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 40

requirements of the FLSA. With few exceptions not relevant here, 75
76
they plainly cannot.
The FLSA's "Minimum Wage" and "Overtime" provisions both
contain language that clearly evinces an intention to preclude parties
from contracting around its requirements. 77 The minimum wage provision provides that "[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees" the required minimum wage. 78 Similarly, the overtime provision
states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees .

.

. for a workweek longer

than forty hours unless such employee receives" the proper overtime
premium.

79

Use of the term "shall" operates to make these provisions
mandatory and demonstrates an intent to prohibit contracting
around them. 80 Moreover, a major impetus for the FLSA was the recognition that employers and employees possessed significantly disparate bargaining power, which often allowed employers to subject
employees to "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living." 81 Thus, the minimum wage and overtime provisions were enacted to alter the freedom of contract that had
previously existed. To enable employers to contract around these requirements would thus fly in the face of the plain language of the
provisions. Moreover, doing so would flout Congress's recognition
that the bargaining power between employer and employee needed to
75. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(b)(1)-(2) (2000) (exempting agreements made as a result of
collective bargaining by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the National
Labor Relations Board); id. § 207(b) (3) (exempting agreements involving employers engaged in the distribution of petroleum products).
76. See Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (internal
citation omitted) ("FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would 'nullify the purposes' of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it
was designed to effectuate.").
77. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2000) (minimum wage provision); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)
(2000) (overtime provision).
78. Id. § 206(a) (emphasis added).
79. Id. § 207(a)(1) (emphasis added).
80. See W. Wis. Ry. Co. v. Foley, 94 U.S. 100, 103 (1876) ("'Shall' ought undoubtedly
to be construed as meaning 'must,' for the purpose of sustaining or enforcing an existing
right."); Anderson v, Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947) ("The word 'shall' is ordinarily
'the language of command.'") (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935)); see also
Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control v. Sons of Italy Lodge 0917, 605 N.E.2d 368, 370 (1992) ("It
is axiomatic that when it is used in a statute, the word 'shall' denotes that compliance with
the commands of that statute is mandatory.").
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) (declaring that it is "the policy of this chapter. . . to
correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate" those labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living).
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be narrowed in order to prevent unjust agreements as to wages and
hours and to guarantee employees a minimum standard of living.
Allowing employers to induce employees into agreements stipulating that time spent on-call is not working time raises the same concerns as in the minimum wage and overtime context. In essence, an
employer may exploit his advantage in bargaining power to define
what does and what does not constitute compensable "work." Given
that the FLSA prohibits employers from contracting around wage requirements for hours "worked,"8 2 it would be anomalous to allow the
employer, in the alternative, the power to define "work." Depending
on the extent of bargaining power disparity, the employer would be
free to classify what is de facto work time as non-compensable on-call
time. Given the language and purpose of the Act, such a situation
should not be tolerated.
Recognition of employer-employee agreements in the area of oncall time may be particularly egregious where courts find implied
agreements between the parties. Under such implied agreements, a
court may recognize a constructive agreement between the parties
provided merely that an employee, with knowledge of the working ar8
rangement, continues to work at the job.

3

In Rousseau v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc.,8 4 for example, a
group of barge workers were employed on a "hitch basis" by which
they would spend seven full days working and living on the barges and
then seven days off of the barges.8 5 The arrangement also consisted of
a "no leave" policy that required employees to remain on the barges
during the entirety of their seven-day working hitch.8 6 Thus, even
when the employees were not engaged in actual physical labor, their
employer required them to remain onboard the barges, yet paid them
only for time spent in active labor.8 7 This policy allowed the employer
82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Rousseau v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 805 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th
Cir. 1986); see also Owens v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[P] laintiff mechanics ...may not have liked the company's formal call-in system, but by
continuing to work, they constructively accepted the new terms."); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Porter,
208 F.2d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 1953) (holding that unilateral action of an employer was constructively accepted when employees, aware of the changes in their conditions of employment, continued to show up to work).
84. 805 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986).
85. See Rousseau, 805 F.2d at 1247.
86. See id.
87. See id. Where employees are required to remain on the employer's premises, some
courts have referred to this as "waiting time" as opposed to "on call" time. See Elizabeth
Feigin, Note, Achieving Justicefor On-Call Workers: Amending the FairLabor StandardsAct, 84
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to delegate any jobs that came up on short notice to an on-call employee without having to pay the employee to wait around for such

8
jobs to arise.

8

Rather than focus on the burdens placed on the employees by
refusing to let them leave the premises or the benefit that the employer enjoyed by being allowed to exert control over these employees, the court found that by continuing to work for the company with
knowledge of the conditions, the employees constructively agreed to
be bound by such conditions.89 In subsequently denying compensation to the on-call workers, the court plainly ignored both the burdens
placed on the on-call employees and the attendant benefits enjoyed by
the employer.
Normally, where an employer compels an employee to act in a
way that burdens the employee while benefiting itself, equity would
seem to dictate compensation for the employee. Nevertheless, as long
as lower courts remain free to consider "all the circumstances" unaccompanied by any meaningful guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court, they will be permitted to adopt criteria that,
intentionally or not, operate to systematically deprive on-call workers
of compensation. Thus, until there is a departure from the current
framework, employees will continue to be subjected to burdensome
on-call arrangements without any compensation to show for it.
C.

Lower Courts Are Forced Outside the FLSA to Reach Equitable
Outcomes

While most employment arrangements have clearly demarcated
boundaries between work time and leisure time, time spent on-call has
challenged these boundaries. Despite the FLSA's rigid dichotomy by
which employees are either working or not working, employers and
courts alike have recognized that on-call time frequently merits a form
of compensation distinct from that currently provided under the
statute.
For example, many employers pay employees a base rate for
hours worked plus an additional-typically lesser-amount for hours
IOWA L. REv. 351, 356 n.30 (1999). Nevertheless, waiting time and on-call time are functionally the same in terms of determining whether the employee is owed compensation
under the FLSA. See id. "Essentially waiting time is on-call time spent at the workplace." Id.
88.
89.

See Rousseau, 805 F.2d at 1249.
See id. at 1248.
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spent on-call. 90 In Spencer v. Hyde County,9 1 the employer, Hyde
County, paid the plaintiffs (emergency medical technicians) an annual salary, and additionally, paid them $2 per hour for every hour
spent on-call. During their on-call time, the employees were required
to carry a two-way radio and were expected to respond to emergency
calls within five minutes. 92 Although the employees could and often
did engage in a variety of recreational activities during their on-call
time, they were generally unable to tend to such personal activities as
grocery shopping, going to a movie, having their car repaired, or visit93

ing a doctor.

The employer seemed to recognize that while not equivalent to
time spent on active duty, the employees' on-call time did subject
them to certain restrictions and burdens. As such, the $2 per hour
presumably represented compensation commensurate with the relative burden placed on the employees. 9 4 While such an arrangement
could be commended for recognizing the relative burdens placed on
on-call employees, because the $2 rate falls below the minimum wage,
it is simply untenable under the current law. Where an employer pays
a rate below the minimum wage for services rendered, the employer
has violated the FLSA, regardless of whether this rate is actually com95
mensurate with the burden experienced by the employee.
With that said, courts have recognized the inequities of not compensating employees at all for time spent on-call and have stretched
the parameters of the Act in order to reach equitable outcomes. In
Brown v. Allen ParishPolicejury,96 plaintiff Hazel Brown was hired on as
Allen Parish Airport's caretaker. 97 Mrs. Brown's duties included providing fuel to incoming and outgoing planes, clearing the runway of
debris, notifying her employer to cut the grass around the airstrip,
patrolling the hangers for trespassers, and keeping a general watch
over the airport. 98 Furthermore, because the arrival and departure of
90. See Nicol & Botteril, supra note 67, at 2 (indicating that "generally, but not always,
employees are compensated monetarily for the period of [time which they are on] call,
usually with a stipend which is less than their hourly rate").
91. 959 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.C. 1997).
92. See id. at 722.
93. See id. at 723.
94. The court in Spencer, after finding that there were material facts still in dispute,
denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Spencer, 959 F. Supp. at 727.
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2000) (requiring that employers pay to each of his employees the minimum wage).
96. 526 So. 2d 1190 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
97. Id. at 1191.
98. See id.
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planes was generally unpredictable, she "was required to be on the
premises continually twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, including holidays." 9 9 For her work, Mrs. Brown received monthly wages
of $75, living quarters valued at between $60 and $120 per month,
and utilities of $40 per month. 10 0
After suing under the FLSA for past due minimum wages and
overtime compensation, the court held that, in light of the twenty-four
hour job requirement, the compensation provided was inadequate. 10 1
The court remanded the case to the district court for a determination
of actual hours worked. 10 2 It instructed the lower court that Brown
must receive the minimum wage for time actually worked, along with
the FLSA overtime premium for all hours worked over forty in any
given week. 10 3 Moreover, the court sought to compensate Brown for
the additional burdens placed on her as a result of continually being
on-call. 10 4 As the court indicated:

[W] e feel that Mrs. Brown's compensation should include an additional amount that takes into account the restrictions on her personal freedom caused by the 24-hour job requirement. Hence, we
feel that an additional amount of 15% of her estimated actual
weekly work time would adequately10compensate
Mrs. Brown for
5
any inconvenience she experienced.
As Hyde County did in Spencer, the court in Brown recognized
that, while not equivalent to active duty, time spent on-call places burdens of its own on employees that, in certain circumstances, ought to
merit compensation.1 06 The problem with the remedy in Brown is that
it has no basis in the FLSA. While a plaintiff may be entitled to liquidated damages and/or attorney's fees in FLSA cases, the extra 15%
represented neither of these. Instead, the court based this valuation
upon the burden imposed on Brown as a result of being continually
on-call. 10 7 While Brown represents a laudable attempt to compensate
employees for their time on-call, it is nevertheless apparent that the
court was forced to go outside the bounds of the FLSA to do so.
Taken together, Spencer and Brown represent an acknowledgment
of the fact that time spent on-call subjects employees to certain restric99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
See
See
See
See
Id.
See
Id.
Id.

id. at 1193.
id.
id. at 1194.
id.
id.
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tions and burdens that will often warrant some form of compensation.
The fact that the employer in Spencer and the court in Brown had to go
outside the parameters of the FLSA is noteworthy and indicative of
the fact that the FLSA's strict work/leisure paradigm, as currently
drafted, is unable to equitably address the issue of time spent on-call.
M.

The Courts' Inabilty to Produce Equitable and
Consistent Results Under the Current Framework
Confirms That an Amendment Is Needed

A. An Amendment Is Needed to Rectify the Inequities and
Inconsistencies That Characterize Current On-Call
Jurisprudence
The presumption that on-call time must necessarily be either
"work" or "not work" has spawned a nebulous body of law in which oncall workers are routinely denied compensation despite the significant
burdens that they are forced to bear by their employers.10 8 Much of
the current legal scholarship regarding on-call time has criticized the
manner in which courts have applied the Armour-Skidmore framework
and has suggested that courts modify their analyses under this framework in order to produce more equitable results. 10 9 Some commentators have offered well-reasoned suggestions for altering the Court's
doctrinal approach, which, if adopted, would appear to promote
fairer results for on-call workers. 110 However, to the extent that such
proposals accept the presumption that on-call time may properly be
classified as either "work" or "not work," they address only the problem's symptoms and not its root.
As Part II demonstrated, attempts to classify on-call time as either
"work" or "not work" represent a legal fiction that sixty years of misguided jurisprudence have proven untenable.1 1 1 Because on-call time
typically does not fit into the conventional notion of "work," and because time spent on-call can rarely be equated with time spent on active duty, courts have generally been compelled to deny compensation
108. See supra Parts III.B-C. (discussing the problems that courts have had adjudicating
on-call cases under the Armour-Skidmore framework).
109. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 29, at 2644-47 (arguing that courts ought to place
more emphasis on the extent to which on-call time benefits the employer); Feigin, supra
note 87, at 370 (recommending that employer-employee agreements regarding the compensability of on-call time be eliminated from courts' analyses).
110. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 29, at 2644-47; Feigin, supra note 87, at 370.
111. See supra Parts II.B-C (discussing the problems that courts have had adjudicating
on-call cases under the Armour-Skidmore framework).
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to on-call workers even where the patent unfairness of such non-compensation is explicitly recognized.1 1 2 Absent an amendment in which
on-call time is recognized as a distinctive work arrangement, which in
and of itself, merits compensation, courts will continue to be hamstrung in their abilities to equitably adjudicate on-call cases, and employees will continue to be subjected to burdensome on-call shifts
without compensation.
Moreover, unless and until the FLSA is amended, lower courts
will continue to be bound by the Supreme Court's acceptance of a
pure work/leisure paradigm. Given the Supreme Court's admonition
to "consider all the circumstances"' 1 3 under this paradigm, absent an
amendment, courts will continue to have broad discretion to approach on-call cases as they see fit, provided only that these approaches conform with the broad contours of the Armour-Skidmore
framework. Because this framework is so vague, however, courts will
inevitably continue to approach on-call cases in a variety of ways, and,
as a result, the current inter-circuit inconsistencies will be permitted
to endure.
Consequently, unless a departure is made from the current
framework, both the inconsistencies and inequities that characterize
current on-call jurisprudence will likely continue to exist.
B.

The Proposal

At the end of the opinion in Bright, the court acknowledged "the
obvious truth that the long continued aspect of Bright's on-call status
made his job highly undesirable and arguably somewhat oppressive."' 1 4 Then, in a statement that should have alarmed lawmakers,
the court stated that it was also "obvious that the FLSA.... provide [s]
no relief for those oppressive and confining conditions."11 5
This Comment argues that the FLSA should provide relief for
such conditions through an amendment to the FLSA, explicitly acknowledging on-call time as a distinct category of compensable work.
Such an amendment would eliminate much of the confusion and uncertainty that have dominated on-call jurisprudence for so many years.
112. See Bright v. Houston Nw. Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 678-79 (5th Cir.
1991) (acknowledging that despite the fact that "the long continued aspect of Bright's oncall status made his job highly undesirable and arguably somewhat oppressive . . ." it was
"obvious that the FLSA . . . provide[s] no relief for those oppressive and confining
conditions").
113. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944).
114. Bright, 934 F.2d at 678.
115. Id. at 678-79.
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At the same time, it would clear the dockets of cases brought by aggrieved employees faced with the often Sisyphean task of demonstrating that their on-call time was in fact work time.
The proposed amendment is not intended to be hostile toward
the notion of on-call time, since properly implemented, on-call arrangements may provide mutual benefits to both employer and employee. For employers, on-call time arrangements enable them to
more efficiently accommodate fluctuating workloads. The amendment, then, would simply ensure that the on-call employee is compensated for providing this benefit.
To this end, the amendment would first create a minimum
wage-somewhat lower than the "regular" minimum wage-for all
hours spent on-call. Compensating employees for such time spent recognizes that on-call time places significant burdens on the employee
and creates a very real benefit for the employer-a benefit that should
not be received for free. At the same time, by creating an "on-call
minimum wage" lower than the "regular" minimum wage, the amendment recognizes that, typically, the relevant burdens and benefits at
issue in the on-call arrangement are not as great as where an employee is actively working for the employer.
In addition to the minimum wage provision, the amendment
would also create an overtime premium in which workers who are oncall for more than a certain number of hours per week would be entitled to increased compensation for those hours. 1 16
While on-call time arrangements may be advantageous to both
parties in limited doses, situations that require an employee to remain
on-call for repeated long periods of time are more likely to be particularly deleterious to the employee's mental health.1 17 Although employers should not be expected to act as guardians of their employees'
well-being, the FLSA provides Congress with a clear mandate for discouraging work arrangements that adversely affect their employees'
health. 1 18 By providing for an overtime premium exclusively applicable to on-call time, the amendment would seek to ensure that the fre116.

This premium would resemble the current overtime premium in which employees

are compensated 1.5 times their base pay rate for every hour worked over forty each week.

29 U.S.C § 207(a) (2000). However, the precise details of the overtime compensation
structure for on-call time are beyond the scope of this Comment.
117. See Nicol & Botterill, supra note 67. (concluding that the more time people spend
on call, the more prone they are to stress, anxiety, and depression).
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (b). The FLSA was designed to correct and eliminate the "labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary
for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
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quency of such arrangements is minimized and, in the alternative,
that workers who are subject to such arrangements are compensated
at a higher rate in recognition of the additional burdens being imposed on them.
Conclusion
When the FLSA was enacted in 1938, it altered the freedom of
contract that had traditionally existed in employment relationships.' 19
By enacting the minimum wage and overtime provisions, Congress
recognized that where market forces were allowed to operate unchecked, employers were routinely able to utilize their superior bargaining position to subject employees to substandard working
conditions.120

Because the FLSA does not account for on-call time, employers
have had wide latitude to inject it as a condition of employment.
While the FLSA seeks to protect workers through the minimum wage
and overtime provisions, on-call time has essentially become a loophole in the system that the FLSA does not adequately address. Although some courts have sought to compensate employees for their
time spent on-call, the tide has been strongly one of non-compensation. 121 As a result, the same type of worker exploitation that
prompted passage of the FLSA in the first place continues to exist in
the form of on-call time.
For over half a century, courts have struggled to honor the
FLSA's goal of promoting fairness to workers while attempting to determine when on-call time might properly be classified as compensable "work." This Comment has argued that on-call time is neither
"work" in the traditional sense, nor is it time truly belonging to the
employee but is rather a unique employment arrangement which is
deserving of separate treatment.
As long as courts continue to accept the errant presumption that
on-call time must necessarily be classified as either "work" or "leisure,"
the inconsistencies and inequities that are the hallmarks of on-call ju"
119. See Feigin, supra note 87, at 371 (stating that [t]he FLSA was designed to alter the
and
employees").
freedom to contract between employers
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (noting the presence of "labor conditions detrimental to
the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers").
121. See Brekke v. City of Blackduck, 984 F. Supp. 1209, 1222 (D. Minn. 1997) (noting
that "in the vast majority of reported cases dealing with on-call time, the hours were held
noncompensable under the FLSA").
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risprudence will inevitably endure. For too long, employers have been
able to use on-call time to create oppressive working arrangements.
The proposed amendment to the FLSA should help the Act live up to
its name-the FairLabor Standards Act.
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